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Robinson: Speaking of Direct Democracy

SPEAKING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE BALLOT INITIATIVE LAWS
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Trane J. Robinson*
I. INTRODUCTION

Citizen-led ballot initiatives provide voters an avenue to promulgate
new laws or constitutional amendments via direct democracy. With
ballot initiatives, voters may bypass their state legislature and express
their collective will instead through popular vote––in contrast to our
traditional system of representative democracy, where constituents elect
lawmakers. Such ballot initiative mechanisms are constitutionally
permissive, though not required, but if provided, they must comply with
the Constitution. Roughly half of States offer their voters an initiative
process.1 And those States must regulate the mechanics by which
proposed initiatives reach the ballot, as they have an interest in
preserving “some sort of order, rather than chaos” in their democratic
processes.2 Such laws may risk running headlong into the First
Amendment’s implicit guarantee of free expression.3 State laws that
regulate the ballot initiative process have triggered First Amendment
challenges by popular initiative proponents whose cause did not see the
ballot come election day.
Ahead of the 2020 election, the Supreme Court stayed a lower court
injunction that adjusted Idaho’s signature-gathering requirement for
ballot initiatives.4 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the grant of stay
and wrote separately to describe “the transformative and intrusive
nature” of the judicial intervention.5 He noted, “the Circuits diverge in
* Associate Member, 2019-20, University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to Donald
P. Klekamp Professor of Law Michael Solimine for the guidance and wisdom he shared to improve this
Comment. Thank you to Benjamin M. Flowers for inspiring this topic.
1. Initiative Process 101, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/AJ8X-SUAV;
Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/EU7J-BLYH. See
Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy: A Reappraisal, 104 KY. L.J. 671, 675 n.24
(2016).
2. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 187 (1999) (quoting Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
3. The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Incorporation Doctrine made that
proscription apply to state legislatures the same as Congress. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
4. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020).
5. Id. at 2618. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the Court’s grant
of stay, urging that it “likely dooms to mootness” the initiative proponents’ claims in premature fashion.
Id. at 2619 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the grant of stay).
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fundamental respects when presented with challenges to” State
regulations of their ballot initiative processes (“gatekeeping laws”6), and
accordingly “have applied their conflicting frameworks to reach
predictably contrary conclusions . . . .”7 Some jurisdictions “require
scrutiny of interests,” the Chief Justice explained, while others, “by
contrast, have held that regulations that may make the initiative process
more challenging do not implicate the First Amendment so long as the
State does not restrict political discussion or petition circulation.”8
Without purporting to resolve the issue, Chief Justice Roberts added,
“reasonable, nondiscretionary restrictions are almost certainly justified
by the important regulatory interests” “States retain . . . ‘to protect the
integrity and reliability of the initiative process.’”9
This Comment examines the interplay between State ballot initiative
laws and the First Amendment through the circuit conflict identified in
Little v. Reclaim Idaho.10 Part II first identifies relevant Supreme Court
precedents that guide the courts of appeal. Next, it surveys where the
circuits that have weighed in stand––whether they apply no First
Amendment scrutiny, rational-basis review, or heightened scrutiny. Part
III argues that First Amendment challenges to state gatekeeping laws
should be subject to rational-basis review at most when the burden on
speech is neither direct nor severe. The structure of the Constitution
dictates that the federal judiciary is ill-suited to weigh the sufficiency of
a State’s election regulation interest. This Comment concludes by
presenting a coherent rule derived from precedent that would resolve the
circuit conflict.
II. BACKGROUND

A majority of the United States Courts of Appeals have addressed the
relationship between the First Amendment and ballot initiative
frameworks. The District of Columbia, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits apply either no First Amendment scrutiny or the lax
rational-basis review to State gatekeeping laws.11 The First, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits, meanwhile, apply some form of heightened scrutiny.12 In
Schmitt v. LaRose, Judge Bush observed, “[t]he Supreme Court has not

6. See Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 643 n.1 (6th Cir. 2019) (Bush, J., concurring) (“I
sometimes refer to [Ohio's legislative authority] statutes as the ‘gatekeeper’ provisions.”).
7. Little, 140 S. Ct. at 2616-17 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant of stay).
8. Id. at 2616.
9. Id. at 2616-17 (quoting Buckley, 525 U.S. at 191).
10. 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant of stay).
11. See id.
12. See id.
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addressed the precise scope of the First Amendment interests, if any,
that are implicated by laws that regulate only the mechanics of an
initiative process,” but the Court has provided guidance.13
A. Supreme Court Guidance
In the landmark decision United States v. O’Brien,14 The government
prosecuted Paul O’Brien after he burned his Selective Service
registration certificate in a public display on the steps of a Boston
Courthouse.15 O’Brien violated the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, which proscribed knowingly destroying or mutilating one’s
registration certificate.16 O’Brien asserted that the Act unconstitutionally
suppressed his freedom of speech.17
The Court explained that a “sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”18 Here, the law’s ban on
burning draft cards incidentally burdened O’Brien’s anti-draft
expression. The Supreme Court held a regulation that incidentally
restricts speech is constitutional if: “it is within the constitutional power
of the Government,” “it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest,” “the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression,” and “the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.”19 That four-part test imparts intermediate
scrutiny by weighing free expression interests against governmental
interests in upholding laws that restrain conduct but incidentally restrict
speech.20
Derived from First Amendment challenges related to ballot access,
the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework “consider[s] the character
and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate,”
against the State’s “precise interests put forward . . . as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule.”21 In three steps, courts: evaluate the

13. 933 F.3d at 644 (Bush, J., concurring).
14. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
15. Id. at 369.
16. Id. at 370.
17. See id. at 376.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 377.
20. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 279 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[W]e apply the intermediate
scrutiny standard set out in O'Brien.”).
21. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
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severity of the restriction imposed,22 “evaluate the state’s interests in and
justifications for the regulation,23 and last, determine the constitutional
legitimacy of the restrictions in light of the strength of the stated
interests.24 This test, like O’Brien, effectively subjects the challenged
State election regulation to intermediate scrutiny.
Anderson v. Celebrezze involved a free association challenge to
Ohio’s statutorily imposed early filing deadline applied against
independent candidates who wished to appear on the ballot.25 The law
burdened individuals’ voting and associational rights by limiting
independent candidates in a different manner than major-party
candidates.26 At the same time, the Court recognized that “State[s’]
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”27 Here, the Court
determined the early deadline provision against independent candidates
imposed a burden on voters’ associational rights that was sufficiently
severe to violate the First Amendment.28
In Anderson’s lineage, Burdick v. Takushi reviewed Hawaii’s
prohibition on write-in voting under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.29 Hawaii justified “its ban on write-in voting” by
asserting interests “in avoiding the possibility of unrestrained
factionalism at the general election,” and “winnowing out candidates.”30
Unlike Ohio’s early filing provision in Anderson, the Court upheld
Hawaii’s write-in provision. Nevertheless, Anderson and Burdick are
together the genesis of an interest-balancing test courts have applied to
State ballot access provisions.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Meyer v. Grant established that
strict scrutiny applies to a ballot initiative regulations targeting speech,
not election mechanics; it is a leading case on First Amendment
challenges to State ballot initiative laws.31 In Colorado, proponents of a
new state law or constitutional amendment can place their initiative on
the general election ballot only if they produce an initiative petition with
the requisite number of qualified signatures.32 But Colorado
22. Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 639 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 460 U.S. at 783.
26. Id. at 787.
27. Id. at 788.
28. Id. at 806.
29. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
30. Id. at 439 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
31. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
32. Id. at 415-16.
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criminalized the payment of individuals who circulate ballot initiative
petitions in an effort to obtain signatures.33
Grant argued that the restriction on compensation for circulation
unconstitutionally limited political expression.34 The Supreme Court
agreed; the circulation of an initiative petition necessarily involved
“core political speech.”35 As such, the regulation limited the number of
circulators willing to spread the message and, as a consequence, the size
of the audience able to receive the political message. The law also made
proponents less likely to amass the requisite number of signatures to
earn ballot access.36 Critically, the criminalization of paying petition
circulators burdened initiative proponents’ ability to communicate the
message in order to obtain signatures. Meanwhile, the law did not
advance the State’s interest in protecting the integrity of the ballot
initiative process, which Colorado’s minimum signature requirement
still protected.37
Restrictions upon ballot initiative advocacy, the Court explained, are
“wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment.”38 The
Colorado statute imposed a severe burden on political speech, triggering
strict scrutiny, which the statute could not withstand.39
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation involved another
challenge to three of Colorado’s ballot initiative process regulations; the
Supreme Court reviewed statutes that (1) required initiative petition
circulators to be registered voters, (2) required those circulators to wear
identification badges, and (3) required paid circulators to report their
name and address.40 Guided by Meyer, the Court held all three
restrictions “significantly inhibit communication with voters about
proposed political change, and are not warranted by the state
interests.”41 The laws hindered circulators’ ability to spread initiative
petitions, and with that, the ideas the petition espoused. The second and
third statutes obstructed one’s First Amendment right to advocate
anonymously––a right exercised by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, who
wrote The Federalist Papers under the pseudonym “Publius.”42 Each of
the three requirements imposed severe burdens on speech, and none

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 417 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-110 (1980)).
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 428 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50 (1976)).
Id.
525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999).
Id. at 192.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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promoted State interests that could surmount strict scrutiny.43
Neither Meyer nor Buckley is on all fours with the issue dividing the
courts of appeal that this Comment addresses. Those cases contemplate
laws that present an impediment to ballot initiative advocacy, not the
process by which initiatives reach the ballot.44 Meyer and Buckley
plainly establish, laws that severely burden speech must be narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest. But, when “a challenged
election law regulates ‘the mechanics of the electoral process,’ not
speech,” the First Amendment is implicated only incidentally, at most.45
Yet, the Supreme Court has resisted bright line rules in this area: “No
litmus-paper test will separate valid ballot-access provisions from
invalid interactive speech restrictions.”46
The next Section surveys circuit-level cases that test the
constitutionality of State ballot initiative frameworks, beginning with
the jurisdictions that have applied heightened scrutiny.
B. The Heightened Scrutiny Circuits
To apply intermediate scrutiny in this context, courts balance the
State’s interest in enforcing the challenged law against the incidental
burdens imposed on speech. Laws that impose more direct or severe
burdens on First Amendment rights, by contrast, are subject to more
exacting review, and are distinguishable from challenged laws in the
cases that follow.47
1. The First Circuit
In Wirzburger v. Galvin, two citizens of Massachusetts sought to
amend their State Constitution through its popular ballot-initiative
mechanism.48 Their cause was to update Massachusetts’s “Anti-Aid
Amendment,” which “prohibits public financial support for private . . .
schools.”49 The initiative would ensure the State’s ability to provide
benefits to private schools, “regardless of the schools’ religious
affiliation.”50 Two clauses in the Massachusetts Constitution impeded
43. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
44. See Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 644 (6th Cir. 2019).
45. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 207-08 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995)).
46. Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
47. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
48. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271,274 (1st Cir. 2005). See MASS. CONST. art. 48 (allowing
constitutional amendment by popular initiative).
49. Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 274.
50. Id.
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the initiative from reaching the ballot: the first provision expressly
prohibited amendment by popular initiative to the Anti-Aid
Amendment; the other provision prevented religiously affiliated ballot
initiatives.51 The initiative-seeking citizens brought First Amendment
challenges to both constitutional provisions that independently thwarted
ballot access.
The court reasoned that both constitutional provisions have an
adverse effect on communicative activity, yet each is “aimed at noncommunicative impact.”52 Laws, such as these, that target the State
initiative procedure have only a secondary impact on speech, so the
court reasoned.53 The ratifying public of the Massachusetts Constitution
adopted two amendments that independently disqualified the
proponents’ initiative from the popular ballot initiative process.54 Those
amendments set boundaries of scope by excluding certain categories
citizen-created laws; nevertheless the amendments incidentally negated
speech.
The litigation narrowed on the applicable tier of scrutiny for First
Amendment review. The court distinguished this case from Meyer v.
Grant: where Meyer regulated “the means that initiative proponents
could use to reach their audience of potential petition signers,” the
Massachusetts provisions prevented “the act of generating laws . . .
about certain subjects by initiative.”55 Thus, strict scrutiny was
inapplicable. The court landed on intermediate scrutiny because, in its
view, the Massachusetts ballot initiative process facilitated political
expression, yet the laws regulate procedure “such that any effect on
speech is purely incidental.”56 The court applied O’Brien’s four-part
analysis––intermediate scrutiny––because “expression is affected by the
regulations of the state initiative process,” but only as an unintended
consequence.57
The court recognized compelling State interests in preventing the
establishment of religion and “restricting the means by which these
fundamental rights can be changed,” and added the laws under review
only minimally restricted speech.58 Thus, the court held,
“Massachusetts’ exclusions to its initiative process . . . survive

51. Id. at 274-75.
52. Id. at 275 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 at 790
(2d ed. 1988)).
53. Id. at 276-77.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 279.
58. Id.
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intermediate scrutiny.”59
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Nevada Constitution permits its citizens to enact legislation
through a ballot initiative process, conditioned on initiative proponents
gathering sufficient signatures from each State congressional district.60
That requirement—the “All Districts Rule”—ensures adequate
geographic distribution of initiative supporters.61 In Nevada, citizens’
interests in Las Vegas could vary substantially from those of citizens
who inhabit the more rural areas of the State.
The plaintiffs in Angle v. Miller argued Nevada’s All Districts Rule
facially violated the First Amendment.62 The court, guided by Meyer v.
Grant, said the All Districts Rule does not impose a direct burden on
speech.63 Nevada asserted its interest in “making sure that an initiative
has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the ballot.”64 The court
granted Nevada “leeway” to regulate its ballot initiative processes
provided that restrictions of political speech are not excessive.65
The court observed that the First Amendment does not guarantee
ballot access to an initiative, but gatekeeping laws that “significantly
inhibit the ability of initiative proponents to place initiatives on the
ballot” severely burden statewide speech, even if as an incidental
consequence.66 Thus, the court weighed the severity of the burden on
ballot access imposed by the All District Rule against the Nevada’s
election regulation interests—interest balancing of this kind is the
hallmark of intermediate scrutiny. The court determined Nevada’s
interests in regulating its elections and fostering statewide grassroots
support for a ballot initiative justified the First Amendment burden.67
3. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has historically applied rational-basis review to
First Amendment challenges of State ballot initiative regulations, but
switched to the Anderson-Burdick framework.68 Recent cases have
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 276.
Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012). See NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2.
Angle, 673 F.3d at 1126.
Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1135 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1988).).
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1135.
See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1f (reserving the initiative power to “the people of each
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raised doubt as to the propriety of that course, a course that began with
Obama for America v. Husted.69 Initially, in Taxpayers United for
Assessment Cuts v. Austin, the Sixth Circuit decided a freedom-ofassociation challenge to a Michigan statute that conditioned ballot
access on a requisite minimum number of initiative petition signatures.70
Even with the freedom of expression element, the Sixth Circuit applied
rational-basis review, not the Anderson-Burdick balancing because the
law was content-neutral and non-discriminatory.71 Here, unlike in Meyer
v. Grant, Michigan’s minimum signature law imposed no restriction on
advocacy.72 That distinction was dispositive; the Sixth Circuit found that
Michigan’s interest in requiring sufficient support before granting ballot
access outweighed the secondary effects on speech.73
Even though Obama for America was not about ballot initiatives, but
early in-person voting,74 it is relevant here for importing the AndersonBurdick balancing framework to First Amendment challenges to voting
restrictions in the Sixth Circuit.75
Schmitt v. LaRose, by contrast, squarely presented a First Amendment
challenge to “the laws [that] regulate the process by which initiative
legislation is put before the electorate.”76 The plaintiffs argued that
Ohio’s gatekeeping laws created an unconstitutional prior restraint on
ballot initiative proposals, and therefore “unduly hamper[] their right to
political expression.”77 After dispelling the notion that the laws imposed
a prior restraint on speech, the majority resorted to the AndersonBurdick balancing framework to parse the constitutionality of Ohio’s
ballot initiative process. The majority did not explain why Ohio’s laws
warranted heightened scrutiny; the court simply reasoned: “we generally
evaluate First Amendment challenges to state election regulations under
the three-step Anderson-Burdick framework.”78 The court determined
that the ballot-initiative process did not impose a severe restriction on
speech, only “at most, a second-order effect on protected speech.”79 The

municipality”).
69. 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012).
70. Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 293 (6th Cir. 1993).
71. Id. at 297.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 425.
75. Id. at 430; See also Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Obama for
America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 430 (6th Cir. 2012)) (“The Anderson-Burdick test may apply to First
Amendment claims as well as to Equal Protection claims”).
76. Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2019).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 639.
79. Id. at 638.
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court further concluded that the State’s interest in preserving the
integrity of the election process, among other interests, justified the
minor restrictions.80 Therefore, the court concluded that Ohio’s
gatekeeping laws comply with the First Amendment.81
Judge Bush concurred in part and in the judgment, but did not join the
Court’s First Amendment analysis because he would have applied
rational-basis review.82 State-enacted “rules of election mechanics that
are content-neutral and do not discriminate against any particular point
of view,” he explained, do not “run[] afoul of the First Amendment.”83
The Ohio ballot initiative laws, Judge Bush continued, do not interfere
with an individual’s First Amendment right “to advocate for a proposed
initiative,” rather they regulate election mechanics.84 Those laws “ensure
that certain eligibility requirements are met before an initiative is
formally certified for the ballot and voted on by the people” in their
sovereign capacity.85 He placed the issue raised in Schmitt outside the
reach of Anderson-Burdick, which had been traditionally limited to
“laws that burden candidates from appearing on the ballot86—not a
general “First Amendment challenge to state election regulations.”87 In
Judge Bush’s judgment, Ohio’s content-neutral, non-discriminatory
gatekeeping laws are legitimate so long as the State can advance a
rational basis.88
The Sixth in Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio Supreme
Court v. Ohio Ballot Board applied Anderson-Burdick balancing to a
content-neutral Ohio statute that regulates election mechanics.89 The
plaintiff argued that an Ohio provision limiting an initiative petition to
one proposal (“the single-subject rule”) violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. But the court upheld the rule because it was “minimally
burdensome and nondiscriminatory,” and as such under AndersonBurdick, “are subject to a less-searching examination closer to rational
basis.”90
Subsequent cases have applied Anderson-Burdick balancing to
election regulation challenges consistent with circuit precedent, but
those cases have raised doubt as to the efficacy of using the framework
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 640-42.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 642-43 (Bush, J., concurring in judgment).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 651.
885 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 448 (quoting Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016)).
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so broadly. Jail-confined Ohioans, for example, brought an Equal
Protection as well as a First Amendment claim against Ohio’s absentee
ballot request deadline, as applied to them.91 Here again, Obama for
America constrained the court “to apply the Anderson-Burdick
framework” to general election regulations.92 The court admitted it took
“some legal gymnastics to quantify the ‘burden’” of the State law
pursuant to Anderson-Burdick, but nevertheless upheld the law against
equal protection and free association attacks.93
The Sixth Circuit’s repeated resort to Anderson-Burdick balancing
was manifest in Daunt v. Benson; on an issue of first impression, the
court turned to that analysis because “[a]t bottom, the Anderson-Burdick
framework is used for evaluating ‘state election laws,’” 94 The plaintiffs
in Daunt challenged certain requirements to sit on Michigan’s
independent political districting commission as violating their First
Amendment rights.95 Because Michigan advanced compelling interests
that justified the only minor burdens on free speech and association, the
law comfortably withstood Anderson-Burdick’s balancing framework.96
Judge Readler concurred in the judgment, but would not have applied
the Anderson-Burdick framework.97 Judge Readler argued that Daunt
“raise[d] a question regarding Michigan's chosen means of selfgovernance, not its election mechanics,” and Anderson-Burdick applies
only to the latter.98 The laws governing eligibility for Michigan’s
independent redistricting commission—“an exercise in regulating the
qualifications for public service”99—do not implicate limitations on
ballot access or election mechanics, Judge Readler added.100 And he was
reluctant to extend Anderson-Burdick beyond its intended domain
because, particularly due to its sliding-scale balancing-test nature,
“affords far too much discretion to judges.”101 Judge Readler would
have resolved the challenge before him, and others like it, by resort to
“historical understandings and foundational principles,” while deferring
significantly to “a state’s strong interest in self-governance.”102 “[A]
91.
92.
93.
94.
omitted).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 783 n.4.
Daunt, 956 F.3d at 407 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)) (alterations
Id. at 401.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 422 (Readler, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 426.
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state’s prerogative in organizing its government, including its election
system,” Judge Readler concluded his concurrence, “is a paramount
aspect of state sovereignty, and a cornerstone of federalism.”103
Finally, returning to ballot initiative regulations, the Sixth Circuit
issued an order upholding under the First Amendment Ohio’s ballot
initiative requirements as applied in light of the onset of the novel
COVID-19 pandemic.104 In particular, initiative proponents sought to
enjoin Ohio’s ink-signature and witness requirements for certified
obtaining ballot initiative support.105 Faithful to circuit precedent, the
panel analyzed the First Amendment challenge of these
“nondiscriminatory, content-neutral ballot initiative requirements under
the Anderson-Burdick framework.”106 The plaintiffs’ basic theory: The
pandemic ought to tip the interest-balancing scales in their favor,
rendering the State interests for imposing ink-signature and witness
requirements inadequate.107 Because Ohio’s stay-home order in response
to the pandemic “specifically exempted conduct protected by the First
Amendment,” the Court would not conclude the burdens imposed
qualified as “severe.”108 Rather, the court decided by analogizing
Schmitt, the burden was “intermediate.”109 Because Ohio advanced
“compelling and well-established interests” in election administration,
their provisions survived the challenge, even in the face of the
coronavirus pandemic.110
C. The Rational Basis Circuits
Most circuits to address the issue review First Amendment challenges
to State gatekeeping laws for a rational relation to a legitimate interest.
In contrast to the limitation on ballot initiative advocacy reviewed in
Meyer v. Grant, gatekeeping laws regulate election mechanics—the
process not substance. Based upon that distinction, some courts have
concluded that regulations on election mechanics do not implicate the
First Amendment whatsoever.111
103. Id. at 431.
104. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 806-07 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
105. Id. at 806.
106. Id. at 808 (citing Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 639 (6th Cir. 2019)).
107. Id. at 808-09 (“We have regularly upheld ballot access regulations like those at issue. . . . But
these are not normal times. So the question is whether the COVID-19 pandemic and Ohio’s stay-athome orders increased the burden that Ohio’s ballot-initiative regulations place on Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.”).
108. Id. at 809.
109. Id. at 811.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1112 (8th Cir. 1997); Molinari v.
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1. The Eighth Circuit
Nebraskans may amend their Constitution through popular ballot
initiative.112 Dobrovolny v. Moore resolved a First Amendment
challenge to a ballot access provision that imposed a minimum signature
requirement. Oddly, the requisite number of signatures could not be
determined until after the petition’s due date.113
That indeterminacy did not restrict the initiative proponent’s “ability
to circulate petitions or otherwise engage in political speech.”114 The
Nebraska regulation neither hindered political communication nor
content, as distinguished from Meyer v. Grant.115 Regardless of whether
Nebraska’s minimum signature provision rendered ballot access harder
to achieve, the claim was not colorable under the First Amendment.116
2. The District of Columbia Circuit
The D.C. Home Rule Act established a District of Columbia Council
and gave it legislative authority within the District.117 In 1978, the
Council adopted a popular ballot initiative procedure subject to the same
limitations that Congress imposed on the Council when Congress
delegated its lawmaking authority.118 The Marijuana Policy Project
submitted a ballot initiative proposal that would allow doctors to
prescribe medical marijuana to certain patients, but the D.C. Board of
Elections and Ethics, in its regulatory capacity over the D.C. ballot
initiative process, refused to certify the proposal as ballot eligible.119 A
congressional amendment removed laws that would reduce the penalty
associated with use of controlled substances from the scope of the
delegated authority created by the D.C. Home Rule Act.120 Since the
proposal exceeded the D.C. Council’s authority, it also exceeded the
Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 596 (2d Cir. 2009).
112. Dobrovolny, 126 F.3d at 1112; See NEB. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2, 4.
113. Dobrovolny, 126 F.3d at 1112.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1113.
116. Id. at 1112 (“While the Nebraska provision may have made it difficult for appellants to plan
their initiative campaign and efficiently allocate their resources, the difficulty of the process alone is
insufficient to implicate the First Amendment.”).
117. Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2002); See D.C. CODE
MUN. REGS. tit. 1 § 201.01 (LexisNexis 2020).
118. Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 83. Broadly, the ballot initiative process adopted by
the D.C. Council is akin to state municipal ballot initiative processes, like, for example, Ohio’s. See
supra, note 3; See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.11(K) (LexisNexis 2020).
119. Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 84.
120. Id. The “Barr Amendment” provides: “None of the funds contained in this Act may be used
to enact or carry out any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated with
the possession, use, or distribution of any . . . or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative.” Id.
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bounds of the ballot initiative process that the Council created.121 In
Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, the proponents argued that
the amendment transgressed the First Amendment.122
The court noted that the amendment merely retains for Congress the
legislative authority to reduce the penalty associated with using
marijuana.123 Congress chose not to delegate that authority to the D.C.
Council; that decision does not violate—or perhaps even implicate—the
First Amendment.124 While limits on legislative advocacy raise First
Amendment concerns, limits on legislative authority do not because
citizens have no right to legislate.125 The amendment did not restrict
proponents of marijuana-related legislation from advocating their view,
it “merely removes a subject from [the ballot initiative] process
altogether.”126 Without weighing countervailing interests, the court held
the amendment “restrict[ed] no First Amendment right.”127
3. The Tenth Circuit
Utah is another State that enables citizen-led legislative initiatives.128
A simple majority typically suffices, but initiatives related to wildlife
management require a supermajority’s approval for popular democracy
to create new law.129 In Initiative & Referendum Institution v. Walker,
the en banc Tenth Circuit upheld Utah’s supermajority constitutional
provision against a First Amendment challenge because the provision
“d[id] not implicate the freedom of speech.”130
The court distinguished Meyer v. Grant, finding that it does not
control First Amendment challenges against state “laws that determine
the process by which legislation is enacted.”131 Utah’s supermajority
provision sets a procedure for proposals related to wildlife management
to become law. And the supermajority provision cannot transgress the
First Amendment by merely making the initiatives it reaches less likely
to succeed, as supermajority requirements abound in state and federal
constitutional law.132
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id.
UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(i)(A).
UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(ii).
Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
Id. at 1100.
Id. Notable supermajority provisions in the Constitution are: the impeachment clause, U.S.
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The court rejected the First Circuit’s application of the O’Brien
test.133 The Tenth Circuit found O’Brien’s intermediate scrutiny inapt
because the supermajority provision did not restrict expressive conduct
comparable to burning a draft card.134 Rather, the supermajority
requirement imposed a “structural principle of government” that made it
a taller task to realize certain outcomes––passing popular initiatives
related to wildlife management.135 Echoing other courts, the Tenth
Circuit noted laws that reduce the impact of speech are markedly
distinct from laws that burden the ability to speak.136 The supermajority
provision is the former in kind, while the First Amendment prohibits
only the latter. After all, “The First Amendment ensures that all points
of view may be heard; it does not ensure that all points of view are
equally likely to prevail.”137
4. The Second Circuit
New York City voters, too, may enact new legislation by popular
ballot initiative.138 New Yorkers mobilized that power to impose a twoterm limit on several of the City’s public officials.139 In 2008, thenMayor Michael Bloomberg signed into effect an amendment to increase
the term limit to three.140 In Molinari v. Bloomberg, Molinari argued
that the 2008 amendment violated the First Amendment because if City
Council can amend legislation enacted by popular ballot initiative, then
“voters in the City will be less likely to participate” in the initiative
process.141 Molinary posited that lower voter participation in the ballot
initiative process amounts to less speech, therefore the Council’s ability
to amend the result of a popular initiative violated the First Amendment.
That syllogism was fatally flawed, according to the Second Circuit.
The court endorsed the rationale adopted by the Tenth Circuit in
Initiative & Referendum Institution. v. Walker; Molinary argued for the
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, 7, the veto override clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, and the treaty clause,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Those provisions make impeaching the president, overriding his veto, or
consenting to his treaty harder to accomplish than, say, passing a bill through congress, which requires
only a simple majority, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, but they are not subject to First Amendment
challenges on that account.
133. See Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 279 (1st Cir. 2005). .
134. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1102 (en banc).
135. Id.
136. Id. (“[T]he problem with protecting the impact on speech, instead of simply protecting
speech, is that no one has a right under the First Amendment to be taken seriously.”).
137. Id. at 1101.
138. Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 591 (2d Cir. 2009).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 595.
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right to be listened to, but the First Amendment ensures only his right to
speak.142 New York City voters may be less likely to participate in
popular ballot initiatives, making those initiatives less likely to become
law. All true, the court agreed, but allowing the City Council to amend a
law enacted by popular initiative does not restrict anyone’s ability to
speak.143 Molinari, after all, operated under “a state-created right not
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.”144 The amendment, then, did not
implicate the First Amendment.145 Accordingly, the court expressly
rejected Molinary’s effort to apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing
framework because the challenge did not implicate any associational
right or restrict ballot access.146
5. The Seventh Circuit
In Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, a mayoral candidate attempted
to time-out his political adversary from the ballot by imposing a term
limit that she had already surpassed.147 To pursue his strategy, Jones
resorted to the Illinois popular ballot referendum machinery.148 But the
State’s “Rule of Three”, which “limits to three the number of referenda
on any ballot,” thwarted Jones, as the maximum number of proposals
were ahead of his in line.149 Jones argued the Rule of Three prevented
him from seeking support for his term-limit proposal in violation of the
First Amendment.150
The Seventh Circuit rejected Jones’ claim by reviewing the Rule for a
rational basis.151 The court’s analysis explained that ballots are
nonpublic forums and citizens have no constitutional right place an issue
on the ballot.152 It noted, The Supreme Court has confirmed that ballots
are not “forums for political expression.”153 The court continued, Meyer
v. Grant held “a state that does open the ballot cannot impose
unconstitutional conditions,” but the First Amendment by no means
guarantees the right to bring initiatives to the voting ballot.154 That
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 605.
892 F.3d 935, 936 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 937.
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997).
Jones, 892 F.3d 937-38.
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brought the court to the applicable standard: “Because the Rule of Three
does not distinguish by viewpoint or content,” a rational basis is
sufficient to sustain it.155 The Rule was rationally related to the
legitimate State interests in, for example, engendering civic engagement
by ensuring the ballot does not get bogged down in the complexities of
too many issues.156 While three proposals at most is not a “magical”
limit, “the benefit of some limit is plain,” and therefore sufficient.157
III. DISCUSSION
The Constitution decentralizes governmental power horizontally
across three federal branches, as well as vertically, between one national
government and fifty sovereign States’. The Tenth Amendment,
moreover, crystalizes the division of power between federal and State
governments by “reserv[ing] to the Sates respectively,” “[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”158 And the
Elections Clause of Article I specifically gives States initial control over
the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.”159 As a corollary,
States have the power––indeed the constitutional command––to regulate
and structure their own federal elections.160
States have no constitutional obligation to open their election ballots
to citizen-led ballot initiatives. Put differently, the Constitution
guarantees no citizen a right to place an initiative on the ballot.161 Still,
many States embrace direct democracy by providing an avenue to
promulgate law by popular vote. If a State does provide a ballot
initiative process, either by constitutional provision or statute, those
laws that regulate mechanics of the ballot initiative process must comply
with the Constitution. In particular, those laws must not abridge the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, as made
applicable to States through the Fourteenth Amendment.162
Some State ballot initiative laws have directly restricted political
expression––like the Colorado laws struck down in Meyer v. Grant and
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation. Others,
meanwhile, regulate the process by which popular initiatives reach the
155. Id. at 938.
156. Id.
157. Id. (emphasis in original).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
160. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
161. Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, 892 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.)
(collecting cases).
162. See Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 9 (1940)).
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ballot. Part III explains why First Amendment challenges to laws that
regulate “‘the mechanics of the electoral process,’ not speech,” in a
viewpoint-neutral manner should be subject at most to rational-basis
review.163 Both practical and principled reasons counsel testing
challenges of this kind for a rational basis. First, a few distinctions
warrant clarification.
A. Meaningful Distinctions
1. Tiers of Scrutiny164
Courts have devised three so-called tiers of review to adjudicate
constitutional challenges: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny.165 The tiers of constitutional scrutiny grew from the Supreme
Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence; soon after, a Justice
Frankfurter concurring opinion lobbied the Court to demand a more
compelling state interest for a citizen to “forego . . . his political
autonomy.”166 Beginning in the next Term, the Court resorted to the tiers
of scrutiny in First Amendment challenges as a matter of course.167
A law reviewed for a rational basis is almost certain to be upheld, as it
must only rationally relate to a legitimate government interest.
Conversely, a law subject to strict scrutiny, the most exacting standard,
seldom withstands a constitutional challenge.168 Somewhere in the
middle lies intermediate scrutiny. In applying intermediate scrutiny,
courts determine whether the challenged law is substantially related to a
sufficiently important government interest.
The tier of constitutional scrutiny applied to a challenged law often
determines its fate. In the election law area, legitimate state interests are
163. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 207-08 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995)).
164. Though it exceeds the scope of this Comment, a rich debate persists in the academy over the
propriety and wisdom of the Supreme Court’s use of tiers of constitutional scrutiny. See Joel Alicea &
John D. Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, NAT’L AFF., no. 41, Fall 2019, at 72.
165. Mariam Morshedi, Levels of Scrutiny, SUBSCRIPT LAW (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://perma.cc/PLC4-SH9D.
166. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (whether
the New Hampshire Attorney General transgressed a citizen’s First Amendment rights by compelling
his response to questions); See also Note, Let the End Be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of
Heightened Scrutiny’s Compelling- and Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1408
(2016).
167. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (“The State clearly has no such compelling
interest at stake as to justify a short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected
speech.”). Speiser struck down the denial of a veterans’ tax exemption for refusal to subscribe to progovernment oaths. See also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
168. See Hon. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1394 n.40 (1995).
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several—not least of which is the “interest in the orderly administration
of elections,” which, “preserv[es] the integrity of the election process,
maintain[s] a stable political system, prevent[s] voter fraud, protect[s]
public confidence, and reduc[es] administrative costs.”169 But
intermediate scrutiny demands more than a legitimate interest; it
requires courts to balance constitutional burdens against those interests.
In so doing, courts look beyond a mere relation between interest and
regulation and determine which interest tips the scale: the government’s
or the citizen’s. It therefore requires courts to inject their own subjective
measure of importance into the inquiry. Similarly, the Anderson-Burdick
framework has been labeled “a quintessential balancing test.”170 In
applying intermediate scrutiny or Anderson-Burdick, a judge may strike
down a law even if it serves legitimate election regulation interests.
Accordingly, intermediate scrutiny of State election laws invites
freewheeling judicial discretion “[i]n sensitive policy-oriented cases.”171
In addition to often being outcome determinative, the tier of review
courts apply fundamentally alters their analytic task: Rational-basis
inquiries ask an objective, binary question about rational relation,
whereas intermediate scrutiny weighs countervailing interests on a
sliding, manipulable scale.
Bearing that in mind, the circuit conflict around the appropriate level
of scrutiny to apply to First Amendment challenges to State ballot
initiative laws creates disparate analyses of like challenges across
jurisdictions. Such disparities are disfavored;172 indeed, as Chief Justice
Roberts intimated, “the Court is reasonably likely to grant certiorari to
resolve the split.”173 If the Court does grant certiorari, State sovereignty
counsels applying rational-basis review to allow States to administer
orderly elections unencumbered by federal courts’ balancing of
interests.
2. Pinpointing the Circuit Conflict: Severity of the Burden
The Supreme Court has provided some clarity to ballot initiative

169. Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 784 (6th Cir.2020).
170. Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 424 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
171. Id.; Compare Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (“[T]he burdens Ohio has
placed on the voters' freedom of choice and freedom of association, . . . unquestionably outweigh the
State's minimal interest in imposing a March deadline.”), with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42
(1992) (“We think that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting, . . . does not impose an unconstitutional
burden upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the State's voters.”).
172. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
173. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616, 2616 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant
of stay).
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regulations such that the window for the circuit courts to diverge within
is narrow. State regulations that directly restrain the total quantum of
core political speech, for example, are subject to strict scrutiny under
Supreme Court precedent.174 The same is true of laws that severely
burden speech, even if only incidentally. It stands to reason, then,
“lesser burdens trigger less exacting review.”175 While Meyer v. Grant
makes certain that regulations on ballot initiative advocacy warrant strict
scrutiny, such regulations are distinct from “laws that determine the
process by which [citizen-led] legislation is enacted.”176 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to “identify any litmus test for
measuring the severity of a burden that a state law imposes . . . .”177
The circuit conflict centers around laws that regulate the mechanics of
the ballot initiative process, and do not incidentally impose a severe on
speech. While “no bright line” separates “severe from lesser burdens,”178
the circuit conflict does not hinge on that blurred line. The conflict
arises after the court has determined that First Amendment burdens are
not severe. Alas, when state ballot initiative laws regulate procedure but
nevertheless impose an incidental, yet non-severe, burden on speech, the
question of what standard of First-Amendment review courts should
apply remains open. Therein lies the conflict: whether to apply rationalbasis review or balance interests.
B. Why the Circuit Split?
A majority of the circuits have weighed in on the circuit conflict.
Among them, most circuits apply rational-basis review to challenges to
content-neutral ballot initiative provisions. That lax level of review
makes sense for laws that regulate election mechanics. Speech is not
directly silenced when a content-neutral regulation disqualifies an
initiative from the ballot; those laws enable a State’s fair and organized
administration of elections, as prescribed by the Elections Clause.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court endorsed that position in Anderson:
“the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify’ the restrictions.”179 Yet other circuits disagree; instead they meet
the same First Amendment challenges with intermediate scrutiny. Those

174. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (“We fully agree with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that this case involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny.”); See
also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999).
175. Id.
176. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1100 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
177. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (plurality opinion).
178. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/7

20

Robinson: Speaking of Direct Democracy

196

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

jurisdictions are more sensitive to incidental restrictions that ballot
initiative provisions may impose on political speech.
Some circuit court decisions cannot be reconciled. The First Circuit in
Wirzburger and the en banc Tenth Circuit in Initiative & Referendum
Institution v. Walker both reviewed state constitutional provisions that
made laws related to a given subject matter harder (Tenth Circuit) or
impossible (First Circuit) to pass by popular ballot initiative. The
difference was one in degree only; both lawsuits “raise[d] the same First
Amendment issue.”180 Where the First Circuit applied the intermediate
scrutiny standard of O’Brien, the Tenth Circuit expressly rejected that
approach.181 The First Circuit determined the Massachusetts provisions
“eliminate a valuable avenue of expression about those subjects,”
thereby placing an incidental restriction on speech.182 The Tenth Circuit
said, “O'Brien applies [only] to laws that restrict expressive conduct, . . .
not statutes that ma[ke] the expression less persuasive or less likely to
produce results.”183 The court believed the provisions only had an
incidental impact on the effect of speech, which is unprotected since no
one has the right to legislate.184
The disparate approaches cannot be squared. The Tenth Circuit was
more persuasive; it explained how the First Circuit relied on Meyer v
Grant but stretched it beyond its context.185 The regulation in Meyer
unconstitutionally abridged core political speech because it limited the
number of people––namely, circulators––who could convey a message.
That is a far cry from “reducing speech because it makes particular
speech less likely to succeed.”186 “There is no First Amendment right to
place an initiative on the ballot.”187 Neither the Massachusetts nor Utah
constitutional provisions burdened ballot-initiative advocacy, only
process. Thus, a rational relation to the State’s election maintenance
interest should suffice.
The D.C. Circuit case, Marijuana Policy Project, illustrates the
distinction. Recall that an amendment to the D.C. Home Rule Act made
Congress, not the D.C. Council, the suitable legislative body to enact
laws related to reducing the penalty for marijuana use. 188 A heightened180. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1102.
181. Id.
182. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 277 (1st Cir. 2005).
183. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1102.
184. Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[A]lthough the
First Amendment protects public debate about legislation, it confers no right to legislate on a particular
subject.”).
185. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1100.
186. Id.
187. Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012).
188. Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 83.
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scrutiny jurisdiction would conclude that the amendment sets legislative
boundaries consistent with the legitimate interests and measure that
interest against the incidental burdens on expression it produces. The
argument advanced by the plaintiff goes: to remove a topic from the
ambit of ballot initiative process is to quell speech on the topic. Not true.
It merely removes one avenue to enact legislation. While “the First
Amendment protects public debate about legislation, it confers no right
to legislate on a particular subject.”189 The Supreme Court has said,
“[T]he function of the election process is ‘to winnow out and finally
reject all but the chosen candidates.’”190 So too for ballot initiatives.191
As such, “[a]ttributing to elections a more generalized expressive
function would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly
and efficiently.”192 Judge Easterbrook stated the point eloquently: “the
ballot is [not] a public forum.”193
When state laws disqualify certain subject matters from the popular
initiative process, proponents of that initiative remain free to lobby their
representative lawmakers. But the First Amendment secures no right in
popular ballot initiative voters to initiate specific laws. 194 Therefore,
when a state or municipality excludes a subject––take as examples,
religious funding in Massachusetts and marijuana penalties in
Washington––from the ballot initiative process, that statute or
constitutional provision should only need to pass rational-basis review.
A Sovereign State, after all, is owed “appropriate deference to the policy
decisions,” it makes geared toward “structuring its government,
including how it seeks to administer elections.”195 Any more exacting
scrutiny would turn to reality the Supreme Court’s admonishment
against undermining State election operations by misattributing to
election processes a generalized expressive function.196
Courts should not apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework
to these laws, either. Anderson-Burdick balancing applies to free
association challenges of election laws. A state law that regulates ballot
initiative mechanics does not impede a voter’s ability to associate with
any candidate or initiative. The Sixth Circuit applied Anderson-Burdick
189. Id. at 85.
190. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735
(1974)).
191. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 (1988) (recognizing the state interest in “protecting the
integrity of the initiative process”).
192. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
193. Jones, 892 F.3d at 937.
194. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1102 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
195. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 426 (Readler, J., concurring) (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election
Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) and Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506-07 (2019)).
196. See Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 85.
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in Schmitt v. LaRose; it said, “we generally evaluate First Amendment
challenges to state election regulations under the three-step AndersonBurdick framework.”197 But that framework is not generally applicable.
It applies to election laws that inhibit free association, such as Ohio’s
former early filing deadline for candidates.198 Indeed, extending
Anderson-Burdick beyond its boundaries has vaulted courts into
exercises of “legal gymnastics.”199
And, even if a content-neutral law “reduc[es] the total quantum of
speech” in effect by disqualifying certain initiatives, thereby
disincentivizing advocacy for that initiative,200 it does not hinder one’s
ability to associate with the idea that petition supports. That is, a
disincentive to advocate for a cause because it is not up for
consideration on the ballot is not a restriction on advocacy or
association in a First Amendment sense. Such a law does not inhibit
one’s ability, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, to associate with
the idea embodied in a failed initiative. The Constitution does not
include a “right to use the ballot box as a forum for advocating a
policy.”201 The Anderson-Burdick framework, then, misfits the task of
judicial review of content-neutral State ballot initiative regulations.202
The Second Circuit explained why the Anderson-Burdick framework
is inapplicable to regulations of process. There must be “at least some
burden on the voter-plaintiffs' [associational] rights.”203 State electionmechanics laws burden no associational right. New York’s law, for
example, allowed its City Council to amend a law enacted by popular
ballot initiative; that law may thwart ballot initiative popularity, but it
does not affect the right to speak or associate with an idea. AndersonBurdick’s balancing framework imparts interest balacing when a State
law burdens the right to associate. Rational-basis review is more
appropriate for ballot initiative regulations that indiscriminately preserve
orderly and fair elections.
Neither Meyer v. Grant nor Anderson and Burdick provide a rationale
that applies to content neutral restrictions on ballot initiative
processes.204 Given states’ weighty interest in administering orderly
197. Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 639 (6th Cir. 2019).
198. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782 (1983).
199. Mays, 951 F.3d at 783 n.4 (6th Cir. 2020) (Nalbandian, J.).
200. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423.
201. Jones, 892 F.3d at 937 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.) (quoting Georges v. Carney, 691
F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1982)).
202. See Daunt, 956 F.3d at 425 (Readler, J., concurring) (“I am thus understandably reluctant to
apply Anderson-Burdick even in resolving election disputes”).
203. Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 604 (2d Cir. 2009).
204. In Crawford v. Marion County. Election Board, Justice Scalia argued that Burdick controls
laws respecting the right to vote, including those governing “voting process.” 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008)
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elections, interest balancing should be off limits to laws that neither
target core political speech nor severely burden speech as an incident to
another election interest.
C. Federal Courts Should Not Balance State Election Interests
The Constitution strikes a delicate balance between national and State
authority.205 “[I]t is characteristic of our federal system that States retain
autonomy to establish their own governmental processes.”206 Several
States maintain directly democratic systems that allow their voters to
enact laws by popular ballot initiative. Popular initiative mechanisms
“are not compelled by the Federal Constitution. It is instead up to the
people of each State, acting in their sovereign capacity, to decide
whether and how to permit legislation by popular action.”207 States must
administer their elections in an equitable and efficient manner. That
prerogative applies no less to popular ballot initiative processes.
Respect for the separation of powers counsels against the federal
judiciary balancing whether a State’s interest in election administration
serves a sufficiently substantial governmental interest to justify
incidental burdens on the First Amendment.208 As Justice Scalia
exclaimed, “[t]hat sort of detailed judicial supervision of the election
process would flout the Constitution's express commitment of the task to
the States.”209
The reason “state judgments are best made by the States, not
unelected federal judges,” is deeply rooted in tradition and constitutional
structure.210 America’s Founders fiddled with and ultimately discarded
the idea of direct democracy. For, they feared the tyranny of the
majority.211 “Pure democrac[ies],” James Madison explained, are
conducive to “the mischiefs of faction”; they invite “spectacles of
(plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). But Justice Scalia was advancing a “two-track
approach” that is slightly different from what has come to be known as “Anderson-Burdick balancing.”
Id. In fact, Justice Scalia’s concurrence disavowed “detailed judicial supervision of the election
process.” Id. at 208. In any event, Burdick does not control laws governing the mechanics of ballot
initiatives.
205. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend X.
206. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015);
Solimine, supra note 2, at 679.
207. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 212 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
208. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1103 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(“We can imagine few tasks less appropriate to federal courts than deciding which state constitutional
limitations serve "important governmental interests" and which do not.”).
209. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing the Elections Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
210. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 430 (Readler, J., concurring).
211. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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turbulence and contention,” and are “incompatible with personal
security or the rights of property.”212 Those defects were antithetical to
the anti-majoritarian system of government the Framers had devised in
the summer of 1787. But nor did the Framers outlaw directly democratic
forms of governance, so long as they were commensurate with the
“guarantee” of “a Republican Form of Government.”213 Rather, the
Constitution simply did not speak to citizen-led popular ballot
initiatives.
The structure of the Constitution established “the dual-sovereign
system” as a “foundational” precept of “our Republic.”214 And the
Tenth Amendment enshrined the principle that the “the several States”
retain “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over” the powers not
elsewhere enumerated in the Constitution.215 Because the Constitution
neither enumerated nor forbade it, “the right to propose initiatives is an
exclusively state-created right that the First Amendment does not
guarantee.”216 While, as always, “the Constitution provides a
backstop,”217 tradition counsels according “deference to the policy
decisions of a sovereign state in structuring its government, including
how it seeks to administer elections.”218 Under the limited form of
government the Framers constituted—properly deferential to States’
sovereignty where an enumerated right is not severely burdened—“[i]t
is for state legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of” provisions “to
their election codes, and their judgment must prevail unless it imposes a
severe and unjustified overall burden.”219 In other words, given a
rational law free from severe First-Amendment burdens, the federal
judiciary usurps its role by purporting to balance State election interests.
Such a course necessarily imposes the unrestrained “exercise of judicial
will,” where instead the States are due deference.220
It is one thing to determine a law rationally relates to a legitimate
State interest. It is quite different to determine whether that interest is
212. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
213. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Guarantee Clause).
214. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 428 (Readler, J., concurring) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
918 (1997)).
215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
216. Jones, 892 F.3d at 937-38 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.).
217. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
218. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 426 (Readler, J., concurring) (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election
Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 181 (2008) (plurality opinion); See also id. at 427 (“or whether the state practice
hews more closely to traditional election mechanics, . . . we owe deference to the strong state interests at
play, absent a clear constitutional command to the contrary”).
219. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
220. June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 369 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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weightier than the incidental burden it imposes on the First Amendment.
Certainly, Article III judges are imminently qualified to discern the
degree to which a regulation burdens free speech or expression.221
Holding that constant, it is only half the judge’s task when intermediate
scrutiny is the standard of review—the judge must still balance State
interests against that burden. On what basis might a judge adequately
evaluate the magnitude of importance of a State’s election
administration interest? Justice Scalia likened such a task to attempting
to “judg[e] whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy.”222 “Pretending” to “objectively assign weight to such
imponderable values” as a State’s constitutionally conferred election
interests, Chief Justice Roberts remarked, “would require [federal
judges] to act as legislators.”223
There can be no doubt that thoughtful minds would differ: one judge
(or panel) may side with the State interests, the next judge—from
another jurisdiction—may just as well go the other way. That is so
because “Anderson-Burdick leaves much to a judge’s subjective
determination.”224 As do all balancing tests that “rel[y] on a sliding scale
to weigh the burden a law imposes against the corresponding state
interests in imposing the law.”225 Such “judicial flexibility in picking
winners and losers in sensitive disputes rarely furthers the interests of
justice,” and often invites “arbitrary results.”226
Elected State officials, by contrast to federal judges, have intimate
knowledge of State interests and are validated by and accountable to the
electorate; they are better equipped to decide such policy considerations.
When the law under review does not severely burden the First
Amendment, federal courts should yield to State legislatures by applying
rational-basis review. Yes, jettisoning balancing tests would sacrifice
judicial “flexibility.”227 But where flexibility is absent, predictability,
judicial restraint, and neutrality emerge—each attribute promotes
legitimacy and allows States to govern under ascertainable, intelligible
legal standards.228 For the jurisdictions that have been led astray by

221. Indeed, courts are left to determine whether the reviewed law severely burdens speech, and if
so, strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 427
(1988).
222. June Medical Services, 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
223. Id. (balancing State health regulation against Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest).
224. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 424 (Readler, J., concurring).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 425 (citation omitted).
227. Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016).
228. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 424-25 (Readler, J., concurring).
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balancing tests, rational-basis review would restore objectivity and
uniformity to judicial review of State ballot initiative regulations.
Take Utah’s requirement that popular initiative laws related to
wildlife management require a supermajority’s support to illustrate the
point. The State legislature amended the Utah Constitution in 1998 after
the people of Utah voted in favor of the proposition imposing a
supermajority requirement.229 Utah’s supermajority requirement aimed
to prevent east coast special interest groups from controlling Utah’s
wildlife management.230 The people substantiated that interest. What
qualifies unaccountable judges to reevaluate that product of democracy?
The same could be said of Nevada’s All Districts Rule. Even though the
Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada’s interests outweighed the alleged
burden on expression, that policy determination was not properly left to
a federal court. The Nevada Constitution already so determined.231
In Buckley, Justice O’Connor—a champion of federalism—inferred
from Burdick that a regulation that “impos[es] only indirect and less
substantial burdens on communication” “should be subject to review for
reasonableness.”232 Indeed, Burdick says, “[t]he State has a legitimate
interest in preventing these sorts of maneuvers, and the write-in voting
ban is a reasonable way of accomplishing this goal.”233 A “reasonable
way” of preventing a “legitimate interest” closely resembles the
rational-relation requirement of rational-basis review. Justice
O’Connor’s formulation asks first whether the regulation in question
targets communication or election mechanics. If communication is the
target, then strict scrutiny applies under Meyer v. Grant. If the law
regulates election mechanics, determine next whether it imposes a
severe burden on speech. If not severe, a reasonable law will survive
First Amendment review.234
229. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1086.
230. Id.
231. See NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2.
232. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182,216 (1999) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice O’Connor’s quote bears providing in
full:
Under the Burdick approach, the threshold inquiry is whether Colorado's
regulations directly and substantially burden the one-on-one, communicative
aspect of petition circulation or whether they primarily target the electoral
process, imposing only indirect and less substantial burdens on communication. If
the former, the regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny. If the latter, the
regulation should be subject to review for reasonableness.
Id. Notwithstanding the intermediate scrutiny test that bears Burdick’s name, the Burdick
Court arguably subjected Hawaii’s write-in provisions to a less exacting standard of review
that more resembles rational basis.
233. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 440 (1992).
234. See also Mays, 951 F.3d at 782 (6th Cir. 2020) (Nalbandian, J.) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“When States impose reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions on the right to vote, courts
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That formulation respects State election prerogatives, bearing in
mind, “a State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”235 Judges are
uniquely qualified to determine whether a law is reasonable; they are not
so qualified, however, to qualify the importance of State election
interests.
When judges review a First Amendment challenge for a rational
relation to a State interest, they perform their essential role. But when a
judge balances interests, as is often––but not here––necessary, they
undermine State sovereignty. Courts superimpose their own subjective
judgment of the importance of a State interest where the court owed the
State deference. Interest balancing of content neutral State ballot
initiative laws defies principles of federalism by allowing courts to
second guess the work of State officials. The separation of powers,
undergirded by the Elections Clause, demands otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION
First principles embedded in the structure of the Constitution and
judicial restraint should resolve the circuit conflict centered on the
appropriate standard of review for First Amendment challenges to
content-neutral State ballot initiative regulations. The Supreme Court
flagged the issue in Little v. Reclaim Idaho, but has not issued binding
precedent.236 The District of Columbia, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits properly apply rational-basis review to gatekeeping laws
that do not severely burden speech. The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits,
however, aggrandize the judicial role by balancing State interests against
First Amendment burdens, even when those burdens are not severe.
State election regulations of process demand deference of the federal
judiciary. Intermediate scrutiny—where courts balance state election
interests against constitutional burdens—tramples on State sovereignty.
A three-part test would optimally resolve the circuit conflict.
A State regulation of its ballot initiative process is constitutional if it:
(1) targets “the mechanics of the electoral process, not speech;” 237 (2)
does not impose a severe burden on the First Amendment;238 and (3)

apply rational basis review.”).
235. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
236. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020).
237. Id. at 207-08 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); See
Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 9
(1940)).
238. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 216 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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reasonably relates to a legitimate election interest.239
That test, derived from Justice O’Connor’s partial concurrence in
Buckley, adheres to Supreme Court precedent by asking two threshold
questions—familiar questions of intent and impact. Finally, the
reasonableness prong elevates State sovereignty by imparting an
objective standard akin to rational-basis review.

239. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 440.
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